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Abstract. The so-called diet and patch models were foundational for evolutionary studies of foraging ecology. The diet 
model analyzed an organism’s choice between at least two different food or prey items. The patch model asked how 
much time a forager should invest in exploiting a resource patch that offered diminishing returns before moving on to 
search for another patch. Concerning sources of inspiration, however, some pioneers of optimal foraging theory 
explicitly denied an input from economics, others explicitly credited marginalist economics, while the majority 
remained tacit on this issue. An inquiry into the historical sources reveal an interesting patter. 
As far as diet (prey or food choice) is concerned, at least two models existed. One was the, probably 
homegrown, so-called contingency model of diet choice, the other was imported from marginal utility theory of 
economics. The import could not be operationalized in a way allowing predictions about feeding behavior. It was, 
therefore, used as a framework for interpreting data on food choices and gaining insights about the relative value of 
food items. The contingency model was hypothetico-deductive instead. It allowed predictions of behavior that could be 
tested. It was, therefore, the more popular among the peers and the pioneering publications have become citation 
classics, whereas the publications importing marginal utility theory int foraging ecology are largely forgotten. 
The situation is different for the patch model. At face value, only one homegrown model exists that was 
discovered independently at least twice. A closer look reveals obscure links suggesting knowledge dispersal from 
marginal productivity theory of economics towards optimal foraging or mating theory, respectively, along routes of 
private and unpublished communications. These communications were between alma mater and student in the case of 
Eric Charnov and between father and son, in the case of Geoffrey Parker.
This study suggests two concusions: 1. models that are operationalized in a way allowing hypothetico-
deductive research are more popular among researchers than others requiring a more inductive an interpretive approach.
2. The sciences are interlinked far more closely and deeply than mere citations would suggest. Sometimes a knowledge 
transfer that is crucial for a discovery can occur as an informal and private communication. 
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1 Introduction
The so-called diet and patch models were foundational for evolutionary studies of foraging ecology 
(Ydenberg et al 2007, 8f, 12). The diet model analyzed an organism’s choice between at least two 
different food or prey items. The patch model asked how much time a forager should invest in 
exploiting a resource patch that offered diminishing returns before moving on to search for another 
patch. The research articles pioneering these models, however, show an interesting pattern. Whereas
some pioneers explicitly deny an input from economics (e.g., MacArthur & Pianka 1966; Schoener 
1987, 35f), others explicitly credit economic models and theorems as their sources of inspiration 
(e.g., Rapport 1971; 1980; Rapport & Turner 1977; Covich 1972; 1974; pers. comm.), but most are 
silent on this question. 
The following shows that the explicit transfer of an economic model of marginal utility into 
a diet model of foraging ecology has not been as successful as the alternative diet model, which 
probably developed independently in ecology. Differences in operationalization and predictive 
power are suggested as reasons for this difference in success. For the patch model, however, two 
obscure paths of knowledge dispersal along routes outside the published record could be tracked 
down and verified. This emphasizes the inter-relatedness of sciences and highlights the fact that 
many kinds of informal knowledge exchange exist. Before that can be done, however, the 
economics in question need to be introduced. 
2 Marginal utility
As marginal values are particularly relevant to optimal foraging theory, the marginal utility theory 
of economics is a good place to start. Therefore, the following takes a closer look at early 
proponents of marginal utility theory. In 1854, Hermann Gossen stated the law that the utility of a 
good diminishes with its consumption. Gossen conceived this diminishing gain in psychological 
terms of pleasure (Genuss) rather than caloric intake or fertilization success, but later economists 
replaced pleasure by utility. 
“Die Größe eines und desselben Genusses nimmt, wenn wir mit Bereitung des Genusses 
ununterbrochen fortfahren, fortwährend ab, bis zuletzt Sättigung eintritt.” (Gossen 1854, 4f) 
“The magnitude of one and the same pleasure diminishes continually if we keep enjoying it 
incessantly, until satiation eventually commences.” (My translation)
Gossen’s second law stated that a consumer should stop enjoying a good, when it still just gives the 
same marginal pleasure as any of the other goods would. 
“Der Mensch, dem die Wahl zwischen mehren Genüssen frei steht, […] muß, […] um die 
Summe seines Genusses zum Größten zu bringen, sie alle theilweise bereiten, und zwar in 
einem solchen Verhältnis, daß die Größe eines jeden Genusses in dem Augenblick in 
welchem seine Bereitung abgebrochen wird, bei allen noch die gleiche bleibt.” (Gossen 
1854, 12) 
“In order to maximize the sum of its pleasure, the person that can choose between several 
goods has to enjoy each one only partially, in such a proportion that the pleasure at the 
moment of terminating to enjoy one good is of the same magnitude as of all the others.” (My
translation)
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Pareto (1919, 180) modeled this graphically (see fig. 2.1). Indifference curves map ratios of 
goods, for example, apples, A, and bananas, B, that will have the same utility for consumers and 
hence render them indifferent to variation in the ratio.
Fig. 2.1: The indifference curves t to t’’’ define ratios of the goods A and B 
that yield equal utility to a consumer. The budget line mn shows which 
ratios the consumer could actually afford. The optimal choice is the ratio c’’.
Indifference curves are usually convex to the origin because a consumer that has a lot of 
bananas and no apples (n) will trade more bananas for one apple than one that already has apples 
and vice verse for one that has many apples (m) and no bananas. An indifference map is the cluster 
of indifference curves for varying utility levels. A budget line represents the ratios of the goods a 
consumer can actually afford with a certain budget. The tangential point where the budget line 
touches one of the indifference curves defines the optimal ratio of goods that will maximize utility 
for that consumer. Unlike in figure 1, budget lines will often be concave to the origin, because the 
price of a good rises with its consumption as an adjustment to either increased demand or decreased
supply. Finally, the consumption curve that connects the optimal ratios ci (fig. 1) curls away from 
good B meaning that people will consume relatively less of that good as their affluence rises. 
This has become a standard model of optimal consumer choice (Meyers 1948, ch. 7; 
Friedman 1953, 100-103; Becker 1962), which can be found in all textbooks. Economists can 
determine the preferences of consumers to different bundles of goods empirically, for example, by 
using questionnaires. They can construe the corresponding indifference curves from the results and 
use the model for predicting consumer behavior when princes or taxes for certain goods change 
(e.g., Boulding 1966, 620). 
The model has also been used in foraging ecology by interpreting the indifference curves as 
representing combinations of prey or food items yielding equal returns per time needed to pursue or 
handle them and the budget line as representing those combinations of food/prey that a forager 
could actually catch with a given time budget. However, indifference curves could not be 
determined in advance, in order to predict the feeding patterns resulting from varying conditions in 
food or time budgets. Those researchers, who did take this economic model as their point of 
departure (e.g., Covich 1972; 1974; Rapport 1971; 1980; 1981), left the biological utility of food 
items implicit in the change of the feeding patterns observed, when the food or time budgets varied. 
That is, they used the model as a framework for interpreting the observed relations between 
conditions and feeding pattern. Their model was a tool of analysis not prediction. Conversely, those 
who did explicate and rank the profitability of food/prey items in advance, in order to test 
hypotheses about behavior, seem to have developed this so-called contingency model independently
of economics (e.g., Charnov 1976a; cf. Schoener 1987, 12f). 
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3 Marginal productivity
Another theory of particular relevance to the history of foraging theory can be found in Eugen von 
Böhm-Bawerk’s Positive Theory of Capital, first published in German in 1889 and in English in 
1891 (I used the photographic reprint of the English version from 1930). Böhm-Bawerk’s point of 
departure into his economic studies were two problems about capital interest (Tomo 1995; 1997). 
The ex ante problem concerned the question why an interest rate was put on a loan. Böhm-Bawerk 
disagreed with his supervisor Menger’s theory that is was a charge for the use of money or Marx’s 
that it was a means of capitalists for exploiting laborers. The agio (discount) theorem proposed, 
instead, that a good to be consumed or used in the future was valued less than the same good to be 
consumed or used at present. The ex post problem concerned the question why the debitor was 
usually able to pay the interest. Here, Böhm-Bawerk suggested that the capital investment allows 
roundabout ways of production that could increase not only the amount of goods produced but also 
the value of the goods produced. This is referred to as the period-of-production or value surplus 
theorem (Tomo 1995; 1997). 
These aspects of the optimal period of production and discount of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory 
have been mathematized and modeled by Knut Wicksell (1893[1970], 120-130 and figure at p. 122)
and Irving Fisher (1907, 25-28, §9 and fig. 1; 1930, 57-58, §6 and chart 16) respectively. 
Surprisingly, these models of Wicksell and Fisher turn out to be the ultimate predecessors of the 
optimal mating model of Parker (1974; Parker and Stuart 1976) and the optimal foraging model of 
Charnov (1976b), respectively. This article traces the subterranean roots by which these vintage 
models of marginalist economics percolated into ecology and, there, got “discovered” as models for
the optimal duration of mating (Parker 1974; Parker and Stuart 1976) or of exploiting a resource 
patch (Charnov 1976b).
3.1 Wicksell (1893) on the optimal period of production 
Knut Wicksell’s Über Wert, Kapital und Rente was first published in 1893. An English translation 
was published in 1954 and reprinted in 1970. Wicksell built on Böhm-Bawerk (1891), who had 
Wicksell (1893) managed to construe the investment of capital into an endeavor of production as 
units of time invested by plotting an inverse of the interest rate on the abscissa of his graphical 
model. An inverse of any interest rate (x%/year) will yield an amount of time in years. 
Wicksell analyzed a case, in which workers borrow all the capital required to set up a 
production process, so that the rate of interest on that capital, z, equals their fixed costs. If the whole
capital invested in the endeavor was borrowed at the beginning, the interest had to be paid for the 
whole period, t, that the endeavor lasted. But if capital was taken up in installments, the time during 
which that interest had to be paid could be reduced at most by half. 
He then asked, “how long a period of production these workers are to choose with most 
advantage to themselves” (Wicksell 1970, 120). Wicksell actually wanted to maximize the wages l 
of the workers by finding the optimal production time t. He illustrated his analysis in the form of a 
graphic (fig. 3.1), which is strikingly similar to the now emblematic graph illustrating the marginal 
value theorem in behavioral ecology (fig. 9.1). As the period during which the interest must be paid 
can be halved by borrowing in installments (see above), the tangent meets the abscissa at the 
inverse of z/2 rather than z. 
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Fig. 3.1.: Wicksell’s graphical 
model first published in 1893 
(Wicksell 1970, 122).
In his Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen (Wicksell 1900, 40), the productivity curve 
begins at the origin, because Wicksell came to believe that workers cannot produce anything 
without some capital. He also discussed the effect of a tax being placed on the production and 
illustrated it with a lowered production curve and tangent. Wicksell (1935, 180, fig. 14) used a 
similar graphic model in order to illustrate the relationship between capital, interest and time using 
the example of wine gaining value with time. 
George Joseph Stigler (1941, 279) explained Wicksell’s theory as follows: “We may 
postulate a given number of workers who may borrow any required sum of capital at a given rate of 
interest. They produce all necessary tools and equipment and use these up completely in the 
production period. These laborers seek to maximize their annual wages, which with interest equal 
the annual product, since in a static state there will be no profits and land is a free good.” Stigler 
(1941, 281) also featured the graphical illustration.
Fig. 3.2: Stigler’s reproduction of Wicksell’s graphical model 
(Stigler 1941, 281, fig. Viii).
Later, Joan Robinson (1953-54, fig. 2; 1956, pp. 411-420) adapted Wicksell’s model in order
to predict the effects of technical progress on wages and profit. Carl Uhr (1962, 66) described the 
relation between invested capital and the optimal period of prodicing goods in Wicksell’s model as 
follows: “With a certain quantity of labor and land given, and all of the capital invested in advances,
capital could be expressed as a function of time, namely of the length of the production period 
during which it suffices to sustain laborers and landowners.” Hirshleifer (1967, 191) called 
Wicksell’s formalization of a theory relating wages, capital stock, interest and the period of 
production “one of the most famous developments in the history of economic thought.” That is, the 
economists carried on Wicksell’s (1893) way of modeling marginal productivity right into the time, 
when behavioral ecology started as a new way of doing ethology with an economic thrust. 
Two things about Wicksell’s analysis and graphic model differ from later installments in 
behavioral ecology (e.g., Parker 1974; Smith & Fretwell 1974; Parker & Stuart 1976). First, 
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Wicksell used an inverse of the interest rate to determine the intersection point of the tangent with 
the x-axis. This suggests that the workers should terminate the process earlier as the interest rate on 
invested capital rose. It makes sense, however, because the workers should not even borrow the 
money to start the endeavor, if the interest rates were too high. In foragers or males, on the other 
hand, an exceptionally long search time does not mean that the individual should not even start 
exploiting/mating a found resource patch/female. This is so, because the time spend searching is the
real cost being paid, whereas in Wicksell’s model the cost being paid is interest and this cost is 
transformed into a time equivalent by calculating it inverse.
Second, Wicksell determined the portion of the revenue that can be apportioned to wages as 
the value, l, from the origin to the intersection of the tangent with the y-axis, the remainder going to 
pay the fixed costs. This is not possible for mating or foraging behavior, because the costs and 
benefits have different currencies. In optimal mating theory, for example, the gain is in terms of 
fertilized eggs, the expenditure in energy used for searching. This difference in currencies was a 
formidable problem for behavioral ecology (Ydenberg et al. 2007, 15) and the solution was to find 
trade-offs in state variables instead (e.g., time spent searching vs. time spent mating). 
The above-mentioned differences suggest that Wicksell has not been a direct source of 
inspiration for optimal mating theory. Furthermore, the graphical model of Wicksell has not become
as emblematic in economics as figure 4 has in behavioral ecology. Nevertheless, this model must 
have entered operations research or industrial engineering and thus reached Geoffrey Parker’s 
father, a chemical engineer and biochemist. He gave his son the crucial tip for modeling optimal 
mating time according to this optimal period of production theory (e.g., Parker 1974, 157, fn 1, 164;
2010, 443; pers. comm.) without Geoffrey Parker having ever seen the source from economics, 
operations research, or chemical engineering.1 In fact, the tip that Allan Parker gave to his son 
suggests a re-interpretation of Wicksell’s model. The inverse of the interest rate was replaced by a 
real amount of time being needed to set up a production-process within a chemical plant, where 
capital (natural, human, industrial) was already in place and the fixed set-up time was the only cost 
to be considered. Hence, this lost source of Alan Parker was already one step closer to the optimal 
mating model than Wicksell’s. Otherwise, the optimal period of production was determined in a 
way identical to Wicksell’s, by marking the time investment on the negative half of the X-axis, 
plotting the gain function within the positive (+/+) quadrant of the coordinate system, and drawing a
tangent from the time-investment point that touched the gain function.
3.2 Fisher (1907) on the marginal value of expected income
Fisher (1907, chap. II) distinguished the interest being fixed in a loan contract as explicit from the 
implicit interest. The implicit interest is the discounting that is tacitly made in any transaction. For 
example, an orchard producing, on average, an annual crop of apples worth $1,000 will not be 
worth $20,000, because the orchard is expected to yield that income for 20 years and nothing 
thereafter. Instead, the prize indicates that the interest rate implicit in the transaction has been 5%. 
The future incomes have been discounted by that rate. Hence, the implicit interest is the agio or 
discount. However, Fisher inversed Böhm-Bawerk’s productivity theory in claiming that the income
(e.g., crops of a land) produces capital and not the inverse. That is, the capital (e.g., money) invested
1 The actual source of Alan Parker is unknown (Geoffrey Parker, pers. com.), but any textbook considering a real 
time-investment in setting up a process and returns diminishing with time would be a likely candidate.
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in an endeavor does not somehow produce value (as in Böhm-Bawerk’s theory), but the value of the
expected income (discounted by the implicit interest rate) produces capital. 
“The paradox that, when we come to the value of capital, it is income which produces 
capital, and not the reverse, is, then, the stumbling-block of the productivity theorists.” 
(Fisher 1907, 15)
Fisher went on to illustrate this inverted productivity theory of capital with a model for the 
optimal waiting time until harvesting a forest. This graphical model uses the actual rate of interest, 
in order to find the tangent to the growth curve that mrks the optimal waiting time, instead of taking
an inverse of the interest rate as a time-investment to be marked at the negative branch of the x-axis.
Fig, 3.3: The future yields, B’, B’’, T, are discounted by the interest 
rate, in order to get the present values, C’, C’’, t, of that expected 
income. The tangent interest rate marks the optimal waiting time 
(Fisher 1907, 25, fig. 1).
A point of note, here, is that Fisher’s inversion of the theoretical cause-effect relation 
between capital and productivity also changed his usage. He avoided the term marginal productivity
and instead circumscribed what we would today recognize as a concept of marginal value:
“For, of various optional employments of his capital, the investor selects the one which 
offers the maximum present value.” (Fisher 1907, 25, see also 159, 162, 167)
“The individual selects from the eligible list (of prospective income-streams varying 
in distribution, in time and otherwise) the income-stream which has in present estimation, 
whether truly or falsely, the maximum present value. If alternatives are numerous and vary 
continuously from each other, this condition is equivalent to the condition that the marginal 
rate of estimated return on sacrifice shall equal the rate of interest.” (Fisher 1907, 162) 
Later (Fisher 1930, 57) called it the marginal rate of return over cost. This point of usage and the 
particular example of the optimal waiting time until harvesting a trees will become significant, 
again, when we turn to the marginal value theorem of Eric Charnov (1976b). Suffice it to say that, 
again, economists (e.g., Boulding 1966, ch 30; Bierman 1968; Hishleifer 1970) carried on Fisher’s 
way of modeling marginal value (or return over cost) right into the time, when behavioral ecology 
started as a new way of doing ethology with an economic thrust.
Before behavioral ecology took off, however, these marginalist models came under attack 
within economics as requiring a degree of foresight that cannot be had in any real market. This 
eclipse of the marginalist tradition between the 1940s and 60s has lead to the deplorable situation 
that even those behavioral ecologists, who are aware of a more recent heritage of their science from 
economics, are usually not aware of the deeper roots of their science in economics.
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4 The marginalist controversy
Marginalist theory was based on the assumption that individuals (firms) acted rationally so as to 
maximize their utility (profit). One of the first to attack the foresight concerning interest that was 
implied in Fisher’s theory was Seager (1912; see also reply by Fisher 1913 and comment by Seager 
1913). The so-called marginalist controversy, however, erupted much later. It roughly lasted from 
1940s to the 1950s (Mongin 1997; Screpanti & Zamagni 2005, 413). Some empirical results 
suggested that firms did not maximize their profits. The price-setting of firms was not marginalist 
(Hall & Hitch 1939), profit possibilities were left unexploited until costs changed (Lester 1946), and
firms made decisions infrequently and in response to expected policies by competitors not profits 
(Lester 1946). Tintner (1941a, b) denied that the idea of maximizing utility or profit even made any 
sense as a guide for action in an unpredictable economic system, because it would require a 
foresight that cannot be had. It is interesting to note that Hall & Hitch already mentioned, 
parenthetically, the resolution that the defenders of marginalism would later settle on:
“in pricing they [executives of firms] try to apply a rule of thumb which we shall call ‘full 
cost’, and that maximum profits, if they result at all from the application of this rule, do so 
as an accidental (or possibly evolutionary) by-product.” (Hall & Hitch 1939, 18f)
Later scholars of economics (e.g., Alchian 1950; Enke 1951, Friedman 1953, 3-43) did, 
indeed, employ a selection argument in defense of the established economic theory (see also 
Vromen 2011). In the long run, only the firms that did maximize profits will survive economically 
and only the individuals that did maximize their utility will rise in the hierarchy and become 
affluent. The result looks as if individuals and firms act rationally and maximize utility or profits, 
even if their actions were random and their foresight nill. 
“In an economic system the realization of profits is the criterion according to which 
successful and surviving firms are selected. […] Realized positive profits, not maximum 
profits, are the mark of success and viability. It does not matter through what process of 
reasoning or motivation such success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is 
sufficient. This is the criterion by which the economic system selects survivors: those who 
realize positive profits are the survivors; those who suffer losses disappear.” (Alchian 1950, 
213, original emphasis)
“In the long run, however, if firms are in active competition with one another rather 
than constituting a number of isolated monopolies, natural selection will tend to permit the 
survival of only those firms that either through good luck or great skill have managed, 
almost or completely, to optimize their position and earn the normal profits necessary for 
survival. In these instances the economist can make aggregate predictions as if each and 
every firm knew how to secure maximum long-run profits.” (Enke 1951, original emphasis)
“Let the apparent immediate determinant of business behavior be anything at all—
habitual reaction, random chance, or whatnot. Whenever this determinant happens to lead to 
behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of returns, the business will 
prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the business will 
tend to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources from 
outside. The process of “natural selection” thus helps to validate the [maximization-of-
returns] hypothesis—or, rather, given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be 
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based on the judgment that it summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival.” 
(Friedman 1953, 22)
At that point, economics was the receiver and evolutionary biology the source delivering an 
argument for economic selection employed in order to justify the assumptions of rational choice and
utility maximization in marginalist theories. 
5 The imperialist outreach of economists
Some from the next generation of economists took the validity of neoclassical theory for granted 
and used it as a base for expanding the domain of it into other territories. Thus, Tullock (1970; 
1971a; b) applied marginal utility theory, demand-supply diagrams, and externalities to explain the 
prey-switching of general predators, the food patch exploitation of coal tits, and pasture 
management respectively; Becker (1974; 1976) applied social income (instead of inclusive fitness) 
to sociobiological problems and Hirshleifer (1977) expanded on this. Returning from these forays, 
they claimed an imperialist agenda: 
“The combined assumption of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable 
preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as 
I see it. They are responsible for the many theorems associated with this approach 
[Examples omitted]. The economic approach is clearly not restricted to material goods and 
wants, nor even to the market sector.” (Becker 1976, 5)
“[I]t is ultimately impossible to carve off a distinct territory for economics, bordering upon 
but separated from other social disciplines. Economics interpenetrates them all, and is 
reciprocally penetrated by them. There is only one social science. What gives economics its 
imperialist invasive power is that our analytical categories – scarcity, cost, preferences, 
opportunities, etc. – are truly universal in applicability. Even more important is our 
structured organization of these concepts into the distinct yet intertwined processes of 
optimization on the individual decision level and equilibrium on the social level of analysis. 
Thus economics really does constitute the universal grammar of social science.” (Hirshleifer
1985, 53, emphasis added)
These claims already show the break-lines that other researchers attacked later. For example,
Boulding (1986) took the claim to conquer political and other sciences seriously only to diagnose 
the utter failure of this approach to solve any of their problems (e.g., the risk of a nuclear war or 
maximum credible accident, the desperate condition of the ‘third world,’ the environmental crisis). 
Worse still, it could not even cure its own pathologies of the financial system. That is, he refused to 
regard the market conditions as a given environment about which nothing can be done. Unlike 
animal species that adapt to their environment as well as possible, but are still powerless against 
their ultimate extinction, this passive attitude against economic conditions was no option. Still 
deeper, Heilbroner (1991) criticized that this ostensibly passive attitude against the market and its 
pathologies reflects a commitment to a capitalist ideology. 
Simon (1986) pointed out that this neoclassical approach is based on assumptions, which are
taken for granted rather than tested empirically. Imperial economists have only shown that the 
theorems and models of neoclassical economics can be applied to all sorts of problems in other 
sciences. They have done armchair economics. That does not mean that these explanations would 
9
335
340
345
350
355
360
365
370
375
withstand a comparison if other approaches based on different assumptions were tried. In particular,
Simon had opened the black-box of decision-making earlier and found that rationality was bounded 
and utility was not maximized but needs were only “satisficed” (e.g., Simon 1955; 1979). Etzioni 
(2011) reviews a new research programme, behavioral economics, challenging the neoclassical 
assumptions of rational choice and utility maximisation. Coming full circle, this new behavioral 
approach to economics took its research methods from other sciences like psychology. For example,
at the occasion of receiving the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, Daniel Kahneman 
said: 
“Tversky and I viewed our research primarily as a contribution to psychology, with a 
possible contribution to economics as a secondary benefit. We were drawn into the 
interdisciplinary conversation by economists who hoped that psychology could be a useful 
source of assumptions for economic theorizing, and indirectly a source of hypotheses for 
economic research.” (Kahneman 2003, 1449)
One of the economists mentioned by Kahneman, Richard D. Thaler, later won the same Prize for 
“integrating economics with psychology.” (see Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2017) 
The evolutionary defense of neoclassical assumptions by earlier economists like Friedman 
and Alchian, however, did not only send their heirs on conquests but also had a direct effect on 
ecologists. Some saw that the assumptions of rational economic choice and utility maximisation do 
not need to be taken literally and can, therefore, also apply to animals. Hence, they started to apply 
economic models to optimal foraging theory before the conquerors even arrived at the scene. 
Among other things, this free exchange of ideas with marginalist economics has lead to a successful
research programme of optimal foraging theory within behavioral ecology. Interestingly, the most 
advanced research within this programme also studies choices of animals that are irrational by 
erstwhile economic assumptions and tries to reinterpret and reintegrate these findings in an 
extended explanatory framework (Huneman & Martens 2017). This suggests that the attacks 
undermining marginalist assumptions in economics (e.g., by Simon, Kahneman or Thaler) have 
been received in behavioral ecology as well. The following will not treat this actual research, 
however, but only the historical diet (marginal utility) and patch (marginal productivity) models.
6 Independent developments
As already mentioned at the end of section 2, the so-called contingency model among the diet 
models probably developed among ecologists without input from economics (Schoener 1987, 12f). 
The claims of independence, however, were extended beyond that model to the whole science. 
MacArthur & Pianka (1966) implied simultaneous but independent developments in economics and 
biology leading to similar models.
“There is a close parallel between the development of theories in economics and population 
biology.” (MacArthur & Pianka 1966, 603)
Responding to claims that marginalist economics provided major stimuli for optimal foraging 
theory (Schoener 1987, 31), Thomas Schoener was more explicit in his denial of such an influence. 
“Almost everyone would agree that there are striking resemblances between OFT [optimal 
foraging theory] and certain aspects of economic theory. To what extent are these 
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resemblances convergences and to what extent are they casual [sic]?—the direction of 
course being from economics to ecology.
The answer appears fairly clear when one considers who the principal early theorists 
were. Except for papers by Rapport (1971), Covich (1972), and in part Hamilton and Watt 
(1970), explicit reference to economic theory is largely lacking (Rapport & Turner 1977), 
very likely because most of the other papers’ authors did not know much, if anything, about 
it. This is despite the appearance of such phrases as “the economics of consumer choice” 
(MacArthur 1972), “marginal value theorem” (Charnov 1976b), or “currency” (Schoener 
1971). It is hard to verify the ignorance in most cases, but speaking for myself, I can confirm
its near totality. For example Joel Cohen pointed out to me that a graphical model in 
Schoener (1969b) is a “production function,” and Rapport and Turner (1977) say that the 
tradeoff between time and energy in Schoener (1971) is a rediscovery of the economist’s 
notion of marginal costs. Pianka (personal communication) also notes the ignorance for 
himself, and probably, for MacArthur: “I recall telling a Princeton economics grad student 
our theory and having him say it was ‘old hat’!” One striking exception to the generalization
exists, however: Belovsky received his undergraduate degree in economics. 
Not only have nearly all ecologists been chronically ignorant of economic analyses, 
but to go a step farther, it seems that when the latter were directly appropriated, they were 
less influential. […] Hence had economics never been invented, optimal foraging concepts 
would likely exist virtually unchanged, albeit with more biological terminology.” (Schoener 
1987, 35f)
While the ignorance of economics by Schoener and Pianka is thus certified by their own 
testimony,2 Schoener’s conclusions about other peers must be taken with a grain of salt. First, even 
if all ecologists were ignorant about economics, this does not mean that no influence existed. The 
case of Geoffrey A. Parker illustrates an unnoticed influence via an informal communication with 
his father, Dr. Alan Parker (see section 9). Second, Eric L. Charnov graduated in fisheries and 
resource management; he took several pure economics classes and many classes that dealt with 
economic arguments in a context of fisheries and resource management; he even took a class in 
forest management and learned about timber harvesting; and he called his model the Marginal 
Value Theorem as a tribute to the many economic theorems he learned about (Charnov, pers. 
comm.). Indeed, economic textbooks are cluttered with theorems (e.g., Baumol 1961). 
7 Explicit import of the marginal utility model 
Rapport (1971; 1980; 1981; Rapport and Turner 1977) took big chunks of marginal utility theory 
and introduced them to an ecological context, keeping economic terms like indifference curve, 
welfare etc. Just like consumers should choose a combination of different goods yielding the 
optimal utility, so generalist predators should switch between different prey species yielding the 
optimal food gain. He only dropped the consumption curve through the optimal ratios ci (cf. fig. 1) 
and plotted a concave time budget line assuming that the search-time required to catch a prey item 
increases as the predator becomes more specialized (see fig 2. in Rapport 1971). Rapport (1971, 
585) mentioned a textbook on microeconomics as a particular source of inspiration: “The model 
here derives from consideration of models found useful in microeconomic analysis (Watson 1963).”
2 Unfortunately, the correspondence of Robert MacArthur archived at the Yale University library is sealed until 2035.
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The techniques required for modeling indifference curves and optimal consumer choice could 
readily be taken from this textbook for students and applied to other situations. Whereas Rapport 
(1971) was purely theoretical, Rapport (1980; 1981) used the model as a frame of interpretation for 
experiments manipulating the combinations of food items offered to a protozoon. 
Covich (1972; 1974) independently applied the same theory to the food choice of mice 
species and later to pollinator insect. The introduction of the theory by Covich (1972) is more 
comprehensive than in Rapport (1971) and so are his references to relevant publications of 
economics. He even mentions “F. Y. Edgeworth in 1881” and “I. Fisher in 1892” (Fishers thesis 
published by Yale University Press) in the main text though not in the reference list. Covich (1972) 
manipulated the availability of food items (pumpkin and sunflower seeds) for deer and beech mice, 
in order to construe the model from the observed change in feeding behavior resulting. That is, the 
utility in energy gain of the food items remained implicit and the behavior informed the model 
builder about the indifference relations of the food items. The model was the theoretical framework 
for interpreting the behavior. Later, Covich (1974) use this theoretical framework in order to 
interpret findings of his peers about pollinator behavior. 
Both Rapport and Covich used the model, in order to gain insights about the value of 
different food items for their consumer species. But they could not predict the feeding preferences 
from the model. And that means they could not test their model in the hypothetico-deductive way.
Fig. 7.1: Animal preference map for the optimal choice of food items X and Y. 
Three different kinds of budget lines are illustrated: B1 is concave to the origin, B2 
straight, and B3 convex. As usual, the indifference curves Ii are convex to the origin. 
The optimal ratios of food items are at the points Ei (from Covich 1972, 73)
8 Marginalist economics as a college to graduate from
Even without conscious application of economic theory, knowledge could diffuse to behavioral 
ecology in less visible ways. The case of Geoffrey A. Parker (see below) illustrates an unnoticed 
influence. Between the explicit use of economic tools and the unconscious influence along obscure 
routes, however, there is the alma mater type of influence that can be strong but invisible in 
publications. Naturally, graduate research applies knowledge from undergraduate training but the 
lecturers and textbooks are usually not cited because their knowledge can be taken for granted in the
peers. For example, modern genetics research papers are full of terms and concepts like gene, DNA,
mutation, linkage disequilibrium without even once giving a reference to the originators (except for 
deep reviews, papers dealing with particularly recalcitrant issues, or indeed historical analyses). 
Each time and place has its common knowledge that can be taken for granted and needs no 
references. This does not exclude the possibility of misjudgments of the peers’ knowledge.
Eric Charnov graduated in fisheries and resource management including classes in 
economics and operations research (pers. comm.). Calling his optimal foraging theory the marginal 
12
460
465
470
475
480
485
490
495
500
value theorem (Charnov 1976b) was a conscious reminiscence to the many marginalist economics 
he had learned of as an undergraduate, but he did not mean to refer to the marginal utility theory 
described in section 4 in particular (Charnov, pers. comm.). Apparently, Charnov had taken a 
knowledge of economics as evinced by Rapport or Covich as a matter of course. However, Charnov
(1976b, 132) did cite a book on operations research by Taha (1971) on “the second derivative 
conditions for a multidimensional optimization problem to be an optimum” (Charnov, pers. comm.),
which was definitely more than he could take for granted in peers. That is, Charnov did not actively 
sanitize his article from all traces of its provenance before publication. On the contrary, he named 
the marginal value theorem in honor of the marginalist economists of whom he had learned as an 
undergraduate and dropped a citation concerning an arcanum of operations research. 
Fig. 9.1: Graphical model by Charnov (1976b, 132). 
Unlike Wicksell (1893; 1935), he did not draw out the 
tangent to meet the x-axis but, like Fisher (1907, 
1930), he used a rate (slope) instead. 
9 Fortuitous benefit from economics jetsam
Non-public communication is an obscure route for the diffusion of knowledge. Here, non-public 
means any communication that does not reach beyond the direct participants, like private 
conversations or lectures that do not get recorded and published. Unlike Charnov, Parker ran 
through the classical zoology curriculum with no training on economics whatever (Parker 2001). 
The crucial tip for solving the problem of optimal persistence of males with females (Parker 1974) 
came from his father, Dr. Alan Parker, who was an industrial chemist and microbiologist working 
on antibiotics production and knew this method from his job. 
“I talked over the problem with my father, and he saw a parallel in industrial economics. The
situation resembled a process where there was a fixed “setting up” time before the process 
could begin, and where the cumulative yield showed diminishing returns with the time that 
the process ran. To maximize the yield rate, the optimal run time was given graphically by a 
tangent drawn to the curve of cumulative yield with time, the tangent starting from a point 
on the time axis to the left of the origin a distance equal to the setting up time.” (Parker 
2001, 14; see also Parker 1974, 164 and 2010, 443)
As the tip to draw the tangent intersecting the x-axis at -S (negative value of the average 
time spent searching for a female) reached Parker via the private communication with his father, 
who knew it from his job in the biochemical industry. Unfortunately, the source of Alan Parker 
remains unknown (Geoffrey Parker, pers. comm.). The resulting model of optimal mating time (fig. 
9.1), however, is strikingly similar to that of Wicksell (fig. 3.1).
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When Geoffrey Parker wanted to analyze this optimization problem more generally, he 
recruited the electrical engineer Robert A. Stuart. They applied their model to the yellow dung fly, 
Scathophaga stercoraria. (Parker & Stuart 1976). Around oviposition sites, dung pats, the males 
either search for females, copulate with a female or guard it after copulation, while the female is 
laying eggs. Hence the feeding, cleaning, resting and other behaviors could conveniently be 
ignored. The guarding prevents any other male from mating after him, who would otherwise 
displace his sperm and reduce his fertilization success from over 80 to under 20% of the next batch. 
Fig. 9.1: The emblematic graphical model of 
the marginal value theorem. Although 
Charnov (1976b) is usually credited for the 
marginal value theorem, the graph of Parker 
(1974; Parker & Stuart 1976) became 
notorious. 
Parker and Stuart apportioned the three behavioral patterns of male dung flies that could be 
observed on dung pats to the two sides of their trade-off as follows:
“However, extra time invested in copulation means missed opportunities to capture new 
females. The mean search cost S for a new female is approximately 140 min (Parker 1970b),
to which must be added the 16.5 min guarding time during oviposition.” (Parker & Stuart 
1976, 1060)
That is, they ignored resting, cleaning, feeding and other behaviors, because it took place away 
from the dung pats. But their reason for adding the guarding to the searching time was their 
assumption that both were mandatory expenditures (Parker, pers. comm.) and that none of the three 
patterns could simply be dropped from the trade-off. While this reflects the economic convention of
dividing the full costs into fixed costs on the one hand and variable costs on the other, such 
economic reasoning did not inform their choice (Parker, pers. comm.). 
However, a comparison with other approaches can highlight the analogy with economics. 
Take the biological functions, for example. Searching is for finding a mate, copula for transferring 
sperm and guarding for ensuring the fertilization success of that sperm. Reasoning about biological 
functions, the three patterns either form one unit as opposed to resting, feeding cleaning and the 
like, or the copula and guarding form a sub-unit with closely related functions in fertilization—the 
copula for transferring sperm and the guarding for ensuring the fertilization success of that sperm. 
Reasoning from biological functions, then, would have suggested to trade copulating duration plus 
guarding time off against searching time, but this would have destroyed the model fit. 
Other forms of modeling do also suggest other choices. For example, genetic models often 
assume that drift or recombination would make no difference and therefore ignore them, no matter 
whether they are fixed or variable. In game theory, the fixed costs that all players need to pay 
anyway do not even enter the payoff matrix. As Parker and Stuart assumed that mate guarding was 
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mandatory and invariable, they could as well have dropped it from their trade-off.3 This would have 
turned the good into a nearly perfect fit of their model-prediction with copula duration observed in 
the field.4 That is, they have not chosen the apportioning that would have yielded the best model fit. 
The apportioning of Parker and Stuart is isomorphic to conventions in economics, even if this was 
not the conscious reason for their choice. 
Discussion
My historical issue was twofold. On the one hand, an explanation was needed for the apparent 
contradiction between researchers that explicitly denied any input from economics into foraging 
ecology (MacArthur & Pianka 1966; Schoener 1987, 35f) and others explicitly crediting economics 
as a source of inspiration for foraging ecology (e.g., Rapport 1971; Covich 1972). The explanation 
is that two different kinds of diet model existed and only one was imported from economics. The 
import suffered from the impossibility to determine indifference curves in advance. Hence, it could 
not be used as a tool for predicting behavior, but only as a framework for interpreting it a posteriori.
That rendered it less successful than the homegrown diet model. The relative success of these 
models was only contingently related to their provenance and not due to chauvinism by ecologists. 
The second issue was the rather subtle and difficult one to show that knowledge transfer also
occurs through private and unpublished communication, but can sometimes be tracked down 
despite the lack of citations of published sources. This has been successful and the importance of 
these informal routes of knowledge transfer cannot be denied given the above evidence on the patch
model of foraging ecology. At the same time, such knowledge transfer does not imply cognition of 
the ultimate sources or plagiarism at all. The pupil who calculates or writes correctly is not charged 
with plagiarizing his teachers, and teachers who do not bother their pupils with ultimate sources are 
neither. Researchers who apply the lessons of their student years properly without citing their 
erstwhile textbooks are not plagiarizing either. 
Acknowledgments. Thanks to Geoffrey Parker, Eric Charnov and Alan Covich for patiently 
answering questions via e-mail.
3 By the way, mate-guarding is neither mandatory nor invariable in the yellow dung fly, as studies of their mating 
behavior at sites other than cow-dung showed (e.g., Pitnick et al. 2009).
4 Three behaviors can be apportioned to the sides of a trade-off in six different ways: A+B vs C, A vs B+C, A+C vs 
B, A vs B, A vs C, B vs C. Parker and Stuart (1976) chose A+C vs B (searching+guarding vs copulating), while A 
vs B would have yielded the best model fit.
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